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Password typo correction using discrete
logarithms
Nikola K. Blanchard
Digitrust, Loria, Universit~ de Lorraine

Abstract. As passwords remain the main online authentication method, focus has shifted from
naive entropy to how usability improvements can increase security. Chatterjee et al. recently
introduced the first two typo- tolerant password checkers, which improve usability at no
security cost but are technically complex. We look at the more general problem of computing
an edit distance between two strings without having direct access to those strings — by storing
the equivalent of a hash. We propose a simpler algorithm for this problem that is asymptotically
quasi-optimal in both bits stored and exchanged, at the cost of more computation on the server.
Keywords: Usable security · Passwords · Discrete logarithm

Introduction
Despite recent advances in biometric authentication [12] and account linking [2], passwords are
still the main method of authentication used online and will prob- ably remain so in the near
future. Countless studies have been written on the pit- falls of password-based authentication
[11], with users creating bad passwords [4] or repeatedly dodging security measures [15,10].
Failing to login is increasingly frustrating, and forgetting one's password is now about as
frustrating as for- getting one's keys [5]. To improve usability, some services like Facebook
have discreetly adopted typo correction for the 2-3 most frequent typos, such as for- getting the
caps lock or capitalising the first character on mobile [9].
In an innovative paper in 2016 [6], Chatterjee et al. discovered that authenti- cation failures
could turn 3% of the users away, but that a vast majority of errors comes from a few simple
typos. They also developed a system called TypTop [7], which is efficient both computationally
and memory-wise, and corrects up to 32% of typos. This system works by keeping a cache of
allowed password hashes corresponding to the frequent typos made by the user, and updates
this cache at each successful authentication. Those systems can actually have a positive impact
on security as they make long passwords — which are more error-prone — much more usable,
lowering the cost of using highly secure passwords.
We look at the general problem of storing information on the server that can allow typo
correction while preventing an adversary in control of the server from computing the passwords
from the stored information.
Main results. We introduce a metric called the keyboard distance, and a protocol to
compute this distance (or the Hamming distance) between a queried string and a secret
string, without it being possible to find the secret string in polynomial time (assuming the
security of the discrete logarithm). This is non-trivial, as it was shown in [3] that any
distance computation protocol can find the original password in a polynomial number of
queries, which we prevent by having queries of non-uniform complexity.
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Keyboard distance and algorithm

Fig. 1. Keyboard coordinate system, starting at the bottom left. The string "Arc" has
coordinates ((1, 1, 1), (4, 2, 0), (3, 0, 0)).
Before the algorithm, we must first introduce a distance between strings which, although
simple, is not generally used. Let's consider a keyboard, with a standard QWERTY layout, as in
Figure 1. The 48 main keys of the keyboard and the different characters they can create can
easily be modelled by a 3-dimensional coordinate system. The first dimension corresponds to
the horizontal position of the key (or the row), the second dimension to the vertical (the
diagonal column), and the third dimension to the modifiers, here only considering Shift
although it could easily be extended. This forms a subset of a 14 x 4 x 2 latticel as shown in
Figure 1.

By this deﬁnition, the distance between homomorphic and homimorphic is 1, but the distance
between homomorphic and Bomomorphic is 3, the same as the distance between homomorphic
and homomor;jkc.
The expected distance between two random n-character strings is then
10-character keymashes.

n, or about 58 for
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Algorithm 1: Key-setting/sending discrete logarithm algorithm
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Algorithm 2: Distance-checking discrete logarithm algorithm

Security and performance
The security of this algorithm directly comes from the discrete logarithm assump- tion:
computing P from gO corresponds exactly to solving the discrete logarithm with the promise
that the solution is a 3n-smooth number - for potentially high n in case of added padding. To
implement it in practice, one would have to be careful to choose an appropriate group [1]. A
cyclic group of order P with P a 2048-bit prime should be enough for now, and a similar
algorithm could be adapted for elliptic curves.
With this framework, the login queries are all of the same format - a single element of the
group. This could lead to a proof of optimality in terms of space and communication bits
required, depending on the group used in practice. It also means that faking an id is not easier
than the hardest typo-tolerant frame- work that accepts the same typos. As the size of the group
is much greater than the general password space, the discrete logarithm assumption also implies
that bruteforcing the password is the best avenue of attack.
Besides the fact that it only allows the correction of substitution errors, the main downside of
this algorithm is the time needed to compute the distance.
This is still acceptable on the client side, where the main hurdle is squaring an element at most
1600 times in a large group. Using eﬃcient libraries, this can be done in less than 10ms.
However, the server-side computation is where the cost becomes prohibitive. For strings of
length 12, checking whether they are at distance 1 takes at most 72 exponentiation operations,
or less than 500 squaring operations, doable in a few ms. At distance 2, computation already
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takes 35 times more operations, which is on the edge of noticeable from the client- side.
Checking whether they are at distance 3 (probably the highest reasonable distance for typos) is,
alas, prohibitive, taking at least a few seconds. Using the trinomial revision, the number of
expected exponentiations at distance D n is on average

The algorithm can also be adapted to compute Hamming distances, by checking all possible
values for variants on a single letter instead of going by increasing keyboard distance.

Discussion
It was proved in [3] that black boxes that compute arbitrary distances between strings such as
the one studied here are vulnerable to attacks with at most poly(n) queries, and with 0(n)
queries against the Hamming distance. The for- mula above illustrates why our method is not
concerned by those lower bounds: although a linear number of queries would be enough to find
the original string from the computed distances, most of those couldn't be computed because of
their potentially exponential cost.
A second lower bound shown in [3] concerns the minimal number of commu- nication and
storage bits to obtain n bits of entropy, showing that in both cases, n - o(n) bits are necessary. In
our case, we store and send a single element of the group, and the security is that of a discrete
logarithm attack against the group. We then have a quasi-linear time complexity for current
commonly used groups, with real values currently corresponding to an overhead of a factor
between 10 and 20.
Some questions remain, such as whether it is possible to obtain a linear storage or
communication complexity (or whether stronger lower bounds are provable otherwise).
Moreover, the typos corrected here only concern the Ham- ming or keyboard distances, and
don't allow complex typos such as exchange of adjacent letters. It would be interesting to check
whether the method could be expanded to more complex distance functions. Finally is also one
potential risk that requires investigating with this method. The discrete logarithm assumption
concerns normal elements of the group. However, the elements considered here are not random
elements but X-th powers, with B-smooth X, for 101 < B < 181. Although B-smooth numbers
are essential in discrete logarithm problems [14], there seems to be no attack so far where X
being B-smooth is an issue.
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